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Abstract: 
How might one conceptualize the international political dimensions of money and finance? As 
the world moves from a post-Cold War “unipolar moment” toward the greater uncertainty 
associated with multipolarity – or bipolarity/multipolarity – the zero-sum aspects of economic 
resources may take on heightened significance in national calculations. The paper proposes five 
national financial characteristics that sovereign governments sometimes wield as power 
capabilities: the country’s (1) position as an international creditor, (2) home financial market 
attractiveness, (3) currency strength, (4) international debtor presence, and (5) leverage in global 
financial governance. A new dataset on the global monetary and financial powers of states 
(GMFPS), covering 180 countries and 27 indicators from 1995 to 2013, constructs indices for 
four state financial power concepts, and also provides an updated overall material capabilities 
index. After profiling the US, Britain, Germany, Japan, and China, we suggest a recurring, 
although not inevitable, financial life cycle of major powers.  
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Global Finance Meets Neorealism: Concepts and a Dataset 
For decades, the ideology of neoclassical economics has made it difficult to “see” state 
power in financial markets, although, as with trade relations, the power dimension has been more 
obvious to policymakers outside the advanced core economies (Armijo and Echeverri-Gent 
2014; Drezner 2007; Norrlof 2014; Simmons 2001; Wade 2003). Especially in the Anglo-
American-Commonwealth countries, the rhetoric of governments, academics, and financial 
market actors suggests that fast-moving and decentralized financial markets respond to 
impersonal imperatives of supply and demand, and thus are devoid of politics. Neoclassical 
economists patiently explain that conceptualizing large foreign exchange “war chests,” for 
example, as power capabilities potentially deployable by the state encourages countries to ration 
capital and block its free flows, undermining the efficiency gains from global financial 
integration (for example, Adler and Mano 2016). This is of course true. 
Yet power pervades international financial and money markets: there is competition 
among firms, but also among countries. A large historical political economy literature links 
national financial characteristics, particularly the sophistication and reliability of public 
(government) finance, to overall state capacity and success (Tilly 1992; Calomiris and Haber 
2014; Ferguson 2001). Presidents and prime ministers often assume that possession of large and 
internationally-respected banks or stock markets gives them advantages in international 
competition, while heads of smaller, weaker states hope for financial autonomy from richer, 
more powerful states or institutions dominated by them (Cohen 2006; 2015). Moreover, although 
leaders of emerging powers want to join the status quo powers in shaping global financial 
governance, the incumbent major powers may not welcome them (Roberts, Armijo, and Katada 
forthcoming 2017). Thus, the G7 major states extended participation in international financial 
crisis-management to rising powers in the G20 at the time of the global financial crisis of 2007-
09—but only because the dominant Western powers recognized that they would need additional 
help to contain the spreading panic (Kirshner 2014; Helleiner 2014). A decade earlier, Japan, its 
membership in the G7 notwithstanding, was rebuffed by the United States when it tried to assert 
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leadership in managing the Asian financial crisis by founding an Asian Monetary Fund (Chey 
2009; Laurence 2002). 
The post-Second World War “long peace,” although it only ever applied among major 
powers, has engendered a hope that increasingly expansive and principled global governance, 
implemented by networked institutions and global markets, and backed by widespread norms of 
liberal internationalism, will endure whatever the domestic characters of major states and the 
distribution of capabilities among them (Gaddis 1986; Ikenberry 2009). This hopeful perspective 
captures important truths. Nonetheless, the more multipolar the interstate distribution of 
capabilities, the greater the number of other actors that each national player must monitor. 
Moreover, rising multipolarity undermines hegemonic willingness to pay the costs of system 
maintenance, as illustrated by the isolationist and nationalist impulses of U.S. President Trump, 
which place traditional alliances and loyalties under stress. Intriguingly, theorists operating 
within both a neo-dependency perspective and a neorealist viewpoint, who normally have little in 
common, would suggest that increasing multipolarity (or bipolarity/multipolarity) makes 
international specialization dangerous (for example, Otero, ed. 2008; Waltz 1979). Countries 
should beware dependence on others for secure access to food, energy, military protection, and 
finance. Instead, each nation needs to protect itself by remaining capable across all of these 
dimensions. One need not endorse this stance to comprehend it. 
Publicly-available international financial data has not been collected with this 
competitive political economy perspective in mind, although the Economic Wealth of Nations 
dataset of Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2007), on which we have drawn, comes closest. The project 
presented here makes available to researchers information on national financial capabilities in a 
format that more closely approximates a political, rather than an exclusively economic, 
conceptualization of their value to national governments. Section 1 explains our choice of the 
unfashionable “power index” approach, briefly reviewing conceptual and methodological issues 
associated with alternative understandings of political power, and introducing the dataset, the 
Global Monetary and Financial Powers of States (GMFPS), which builds on our earlier work 
(Armijo, Muehlich, and Tirone 2014) and tracks 27 indicators and 5 composite indices for 180 
countries, covering 1995 to 2013. Section 2 provides a rough overall material capabilities index 
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for purposes of comparison. Sections 3 through 7 explore the five pillars of our financial power 
analysis: a state’s profile as an international creditor, financial hub, global currency issuer, 
foreign debtor, and wielder of institutional leverage in global financial governance. The article’s 
conclusions offer very preliminary observations on the financial life cycle patterns of hegemons 
and major powers.  
1. State power and power indices: the rationale 
States enter financial markets in multiple ways. First, states enter as direct borrowers and 
as lenders. A country’s treasury, central bank, state-owned firms, and sub-national government 
units may each issue bonds. Public sector banks extend loans and purchase government bonds. 
Second, states wield regulatory authority over financial markets and institutions operating within 
the home economy, as well as regulating home country financial firms operating abroad. Third, 
the financial and monetary capabilities of some states permit them to impact the choices of other 
sovereign states. Major states – and often their financial institutions – take leadership in 
international financial governance and regulation. Political leaders also may employ the national 
regulatory and emergency levers they control in order to exercise “financial statecraft,” or the 
intentional employment of (or defense against) national financial and monetary capabilities in the 
service of general foreign policy ends (Armijo and Katada, eds. 2014). Classic examples of 
financial statecraft include the imposition of financial sanctions against foreign states and their 
nationals, the granting of subsidized credit to friends, or the promotion of solutions to cross-
border financial crises that allocate more of the costs to others or benefits to oneself. Rational 
state leaders will prefer to have more, rather than fewer, capabilities to influence outcomes. 
Power, by its very nature, is relative and implicitly zero-sum. If one state has more, then 
another state possesses less. Three distinct conceptualizations of “power” recur in the political 
literature, highlighting power understood as capabilities, realized influence (or the successful 
deflection of such influence: continued autonomy), and inhering within institutional structures 
(Finnemore and Goldstein, eds. 2013; Krasner 2013). The first conception – power as 
capabilities – dominates policymakers’ national strategy discussions. National leaders 
continuously make rough and informal assessments of other countries’ military or economic 
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strength. The assumption that counting battalions or comparing economic growth rates predicts 
winners in the event of a conflict, of course, is both naïve and inevitable. Therefore, and second, 
many scholars prefer greater precision, even if this means preferring conceptualizations that are 
more difficult to measure or may only be seen after the fact. In Robert Dahl’s (1957: 202-203) 
classic understanding of power as influence, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B 
to do something that B would not otherwise do.” A rise in a state’s financial capacities may boost 
its influence over foreign states by augmenting its ability to directly induce, persuade, or coerce 
them, that is, by strengthening a state’s “relational power” vis-vis other states (Cohen 1998; 
Helleiner 1999; Kirsher 1995). State power may also lie in successfully resisting foreign 
influence, instead maintaining autonomy, or the capacity for acting independently (Cohen 2006: 
32-33; 2015: 29-33). A third manifestation of state power is the ability to dominate global 
financial regulatory institutions, frameworks, and agendas, generating favorable norms and 
procedures which thereafter inhere in institutional and systemic structure (Drezner 2007; Gruber 
2000; Kirshner 2008; Simmons 2001; Strange 1988). Power exercised through institutions may 
be direct and active, as when a country exercises its voting rights, which are proportional to its 
capital shares, to make decisions within the IMF or World Bank. But structural power also may 
be indirect and exercised passively and unobtrusively, as when a dominant country designs the 
founding rules of an international regulatory regime in ways that subsequently promote its own 
preferences, biasing the scope and agenda of the regime ever after. 
The field of international relations has a long, and conflicted, relationship with the idea of 
quantitative assessments of national power capabilities. Capabilities are not the same as realized 
power, the components to be included are not consensual among scholars, and there is the 
inevitable question of how/when/why to combine the apples and oranges represented by different 
power capabilities. Yet, by definition, power as influence (or autonomy) is observable only ex 
post facto. Structural power is hard to quantify and typically investigated via dense case studies 
(as in Wade 2013). We might like to observe states’ potential for exercising power vis-à-vis one 
another, which implies ex ante inquiry. In addition, one would like to track the shift in a state’s 
potential financial power over time, particularly in an era in which there are ever more frequent 
references to a global interstate “power shift,” probably from a North Atlantic to a Pacific Rim-
centered world. While capabilities represent, at most, latent or potential power, it is difficult to 
  Global Finance Meets Neorealism     9 
 
imagine an influential or structurally-dominant actor within an arena whose reach is not backed 
by significant issue-specific capabilities. Moreover, government policy planners repeatedly 
construct such indices as a rough aid to decision-making, as the likely alternative is an even less 
precise qualitative guesstimate. Edged round with the appropriate caveats, quantitative 
capabilities indicators and composite indices provide useful snapshots of shifting relationships. 
This project therefore proposes six theoretically-motivated power dimensions, each of which 
may be conceptualized and in principle measured as shares of a global (or regional) total.1  
2. Material Capabilities Index 
We begin with overall national capabilities. The Material Capabilities Index (MCI) is a 
traditional state power index, modeled on and constructed similarly to the venerable CINC 
(composite index of national capabilities) of the University of Michigan’s Correlates of War 
Project, although with some different components.2 Appendix A summarizes our data sources. 
Our MCI provides a quick summation of several standard material components of a country’s 
capacity to exercise relational power internationally—should its leaders so choose. The hard 
power capabilities tracked should be understood as necessary yet by no means sufficient for a 
country to exercise international influence or preserve its autonomy—possession of these 
resources either enables certain choices by national leaders or places such choices out of leaders’ 
reach. The MCI reports a country’s percentage of global totals in any given year, and is 
calculated as the unweighted mean of five basic hard power capabilities: economic weight (EW), 
population (POP), importance to world trade (transactions share, trade, or TST), use and 
development of technology (TECH), and military spending (MIL).3 The MCI provides a baseline 
against which to compare shifts in the various financial capabilities defined here. 
                                                          
1 The dataset presents indicators as shares of a global total, but they are easily recalculated at the regional level. 
2 Available at http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities. 
3 See technical Annex posted with the dataset for details.  
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Figure 1. Material Capabilities Index: United States, China, and Aggregates. 
 
 
Table 1. The Hard Power Capabilities of States: Key Countries and Aggregates. 
  Economy Population Trade Technology Military 
Material 
Capabilities 
Index 
United 
States 
1995 24.9 4.7 13.9 21.3 39.2 20.8 
2013 22.3 4.4 11.4 16.8 37.1 18.4 
G6 
1995 41.8 7.2 35.7 45.4 28.7 31.8 
2013 24.0 6.0 23.9 26.5 15.5 17.9 
Japan 
1995 18.1 2.2 7.3 28.7 7.2 12.7 
2013 6.5 1.8 3.9 18.7 2.8 6.7 
Germany 
1995 8.6 1.4 9.6 6.5 5.9 6.4 
2013 5.0 1.1 7.2 3.1 2.8 3.8 
United 
Kingdom 
1995 3.9 1.0 5.3 2.6 4.7 3.5 
2013 3.6 0.9 3.8 1.3 3.3 2.6 
China 
1995 2.5 21.1 2.3 2.3 1.8 6.0 
2013 12.6 18.9 9.5 19.7 11.1 14.4 
Other 
BRICS 
1995 5.7 23.0 4.0 7.1 6.3 9.2 
2013 8.9 23.4 6.6 5.8 9.9 10.9 
Emerging 
G20 (no 
BRICS) 
1995 5.4 7.9 6.5 4.6 6.2 6.1 
2013 7.5 8.0 8.8 11.6 8.2 8.8 
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Figure 1 shows the big picture of global evolution in the distribution of overall material 
power capabilities. The United States, clearly the premiere power at the end of the Cold War, 
still retains this position, although in a less stunning fashion than in earlier postwar decades. 
From 1995 to 2013, its share hovered between 21 and 18 percent. The G6 is the large loser on 
the composite index, falling by half, from about 32 to 18 percent over the period. Large 
emerging economies in the G20, particularly China, have expanded to fill most though not all of 
the hole left by the collapsing shares of the G6, while countries outside the G20 have increased 
their MCI shares from about 6 to 9 percent of the total. Table 1 provides further detail. Among 
the five component dimensions of the MCI, the apparent slippage of the United States has been 
greatest in technology, which the dataset measures as the mean of a country’s annual share of 
total world industrial value-added and new patents granted to residents: true high technology 
capabilities clearly are under-represented.4 When we locate an improved indicator, it will be 
incorporated into the dataset. Had we included structural influence in world institutions and the 
soft power capabilities residing in the spread of American norms, culture, and preferences (Nye 
2004), the U.S. share of course would look substantially larger in any given year. Nonetheless, 
the trajectory of relative shifts should be similar. The G6 collapse is greatest in the economy, 
technology, and military categories, and Japan alone accounts for approximately half of the fall 
in each category. China’s relative rise is anticipated, yet the magnitude is very large. Precisely 
during the two decades captured by the dataset, China more than doubled its share of these 
global hard power assets, with vertiginous rises in gross domestic product, technological 
achievements, and military spending.  
The validation process for this index is qualitative. We conclude that the snapshot 
provided roughly coincides with our thick, qualitative observations about the shifting 
relationships of hard power capabilities among these larger countries as they have evolved from 
the mid-1990s to the present. The principal function of the MCI within the larger project is to 
                                                          
4 The data for this measure come from two sources; industrial value added was obtained from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators, while data on patents granted to residents came from the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). For the patent data, missing observations were calculated as the average of the values 
immediately preceding and following the missing data, by year. If either of these values were also missing, the 
observation was set to zero. However, not all instances of missing data represent zero patents granted, so some 
caution should be used when interpreting these values. 
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serve as a baseline against which one might compare trends in overall capabilities with those in 
various types of monetary or financial resources.  
3. The Creditor Pillar 
The first international financial power dimension is the condition of being a creditor of 
other states or their citizens. A net creditor position has several potential uses for a security-
conscious incumbent government. A large surplus gives a state the means to engage in foreign 
investment and lending. The return income streams of dividends, profits, and interest from a net 
foreign asset position can cushion the balance of payments: these payments are more predictable 
than inward foreign investments, thus bolstering autonomy. Foreign lending or investments also 
provide the creditor state with potential leverage over foreign states—historically offering an 
excuse to invade and occupy defaulters (“gunboat diplomacy”) or, both then and now, to extract 
privileges such as military base rights. The international lender, investor, or borrow need not be 
the state itself. Both private actors and their governments frequently face incentives to involve 
the respective governments. Governments of defaulting private debtors may disclaim 
responsibility, in which case (as in all contemporary emerging markets crises) private foreign 
creditors will attempt to call in their governments and the international financial institutions.  
Creditors also may exert more subtle forms of influence. Political leaders in the capital-
exporting country may decide to make continued financial flows contingent on political 
cooperation by the borrower country. Although expropriation by the host country is always a 
risk, imperial Britain, imperial Japan, post-Second World War U.S., and now a rising China all 
have used foreign direct investment by large industrial firms to complement a national security 
strategy of acquiring a far-flung chain of base rights and refueling stations along major trade and 
transportation routes (on contemporary Chinese expansion, see Kynge 2017). Moreover, and as 
has been the case for the United States since the Second World War, large creditor states may 
design international financial governance regimes and institutions, ensuring themselves structural 
governance powers going forward.  
Concepts relevant to assessing creditor capability include a country’s current account 
surplus, foreign exchange reserves, and international investment position. The dataset includes 
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four indicators, one for each concept and a summary term. To become a large and enduring 
international creditor a state first needs a persistent current account surplus. Historically, the 
merchandise trade balance was by far the most important component of the current account. In 
recent decades other components, including trade in services, income from foreign direct and 
portfolio investments, and migrants’ remittances, have become relatively more important for 
some countries. Neoclassical economists encourage countries to pursue balanced trade in the 
medium run, and in principle consider both external deficits and surpluses problematic (for 
example, Rajan 2010, especially pp. 46-67, 202-224). Nonetheless, many or most governments 
seek to run trade and current account surpluses, if they can, believing that this enhances their 
freedom of action (autonomy), for example, by enabling crucial food or energy imports during a 
crisis. While there is a political logic in taking such a position for an individual country, it 
undercuts aggregate global economic growth by making trade liberalization difficult and 
exchange rate levels more volatile. The indicator CAS (current account share) measures how 
significant a country is globally as a potential lender, and is calculated as a surplus country’s 
share of the total current account surplus of all surplus countries in a given year. Countries with a 
deficit have a zero percent share.  
With a persistent current account surplus a state increases its holdings of foreign 
exchange. Export revenues, along with the repatriated profits, dividends, and interest from 
foreign assets owned by nationals, may be conceptualized as a “national” resource, whether these 
returns are earned by the private sector or state companies, as citizens and firms that earn foreign 
currency typically exchange their earnings with the central bank, receiving the home currency 
instead. Official reserve holdings roughly track a country’s annual current account position, as 
foreign exchange holdings increase automatically with a surplus unless the country sends capital 
abroad. FWFX (financial weight, foreign exchange) represents a country’s foreign exchange 
holdings as a share of total global holdings in that year. FWFX is a leading indicator, reflecting 
contemporary conditions, which may be quite volatile. Although large reserves are useful in a 
crisis, many economists caution against their accumulation, as their opportunity costs may be 
high.  
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If a country instead invests its annual surplus abroad, then it gradually builds a stock of 
foreign financial assets. CWI (creditor weight, international) measures a state’s share of the total 
global financial surplus of all countries with a net foreign asset position (including foreign direct 
investment and citizens’ holdings of foreign portfolio equity, debt, and derivatives, but excluding 
official reserves) in a given year. The CWI thus shows which countries are large net creditors at 
the world level. If a country lacks a net foreign asset position (CWI) in a given year, then its 
score is zero. In contrast to the more volatile FWFX, CWI will be a lagging indicator, as 
countries’ inward and outward investment positions (a stock of assets and liabilities) are built up 
over years and decades. Moreover, a net foreign asset position also may endure for years after a 
country’s former current account surplus has melted away. In other words, CAS develops first, 
then FWFX, then, if policymakers so choose, they may allow or encourage net outflows of 
investment capital, resulting in a rise in CWI. The summary measure, Creditor Pillar (Creditor-
P), is defined as the mean of a country’s share of global foreign exchange holdings (FWFX), a 
leading indicator, and its status as a net international financial creditor (CWI), a lagging 
indicator. Although the GMFPS dataset reports CAS, we consider it an important background 
condition, rather than a direct financial capability, and do not include it in the calculation of a 
country’s Creditor-P. Creditor-P thus reflects a country’s accumulated ability to fund investment 
abroad out of its own national economic surplus. For an emerging power, an expanding Creditor-
P may become a stimulus to attempt to extend its monetary influence in other ways, for example 
by trying to exert leadership of a regional monetary order (Kirshner 2014: 108-112; Subramanian 
2011).  
A brief review of the evolution of the distribution of balance of payments surplus and 
creditor capabilities among major states begins prior to our dataset. In the 19th century, Great 
Britain employed a large trade surplus to fund and invest in its Empire, while its colonies 
provided a source of raw materials and an important market for early industrial products. 
Britain’s trade surplus disappeared with World War One, ultimately making it impossible for the 
country to maintain itself at the center of the Gold Standard monetary system (de Cecco 1975). 
The United States emerged from World War Two with a booming economy, a structural trade 
surplus, and as a huge creditor to its former allies. As part of the explicit and implicit 
international understandings of the Bretton Woods regime, not to mention the domestic political 
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benefits of a loose monetary constraint on government spending, the U.S. provided a market for 
exports of recovering countries as well as geostrategically-significant new industrializers, 
particularly in East Asia, consequently encouraging others to hold dollars and allowing its 
currency to become overvalued (Frieden 2006). The strategy worked: the industrial economies 
destroyed by the war recovered with historically unprecedented speed. However, by the early 
1970s, the U.S. had lost its structural merchandise trade surplus, sparking the “Nixon shocks,” 
which ended the dollar’s convertibility into gold and imposed a blanket 10 percent tariff on 
imports. For a decade thereafter, the U.S. retained a surplus on the current account as a whole, 
but from 1982 onwards, the entire U.S. current account turned permanently negative. From the 
1980s, Japan instead assumed the position as the country with the persistent and enormous 
external surplus (Mann 1999). 
 
Figure 2. Creditor Pillar: United States, China, and Aggregates. 
 
 
Table 2 and Figure 2 map the subsequent intercountry shifts in creditor status, beginning 
in 1995. There are two declining creditor powers. By the mid-1990s, the United States had no 
CAS or CWI at all. The country’s already modest share of the Creditor-P entirely derived from 
the foreign exchange reserves it held, mainly for transactions purposes. As emerging economies 
as a group built up their currency war chests in the wake of international financial crises, the 
United States’ FWFX, an indicator calculated in relative terms, shrunk to a tiny sliver by the end 
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of the period and its global presence as a creditor nearly disappeared. The United Kingdom’s 
trajectory mirrors that of the United States, and reflects British policymakers’ relatively 
successful determination to hold on to its once massive but long eroded creditor capabilities for 
as long as possible (Coutts and Rowthorn 2015).  
Table 2. Creditor Capabilities: Key Countries and Aggregates (% of global totals). 
  Current 
Account 
Surplus (CAS) 
Foreign 
Exchange 
(FWFX) 
Creditor 
Weight (CWI) 
Creditor 
Capability  
United States 1995 0.0 5.4 0.0 2.7 
 2013 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.6 
G6 1995 54.9 28.1 50.7 39.4 
 2013 21.0 13.3 41.7 27.5 
Japan 1995 41.5 13.3 47.3 30.3 
 2013 2.3 10.5 23.1 16.8 
Germany  1995 0.0 6.2 3.3 4.8 
 2013 17.2 0.6 18.6 9.6 
United Kingdom 1995 0.0 3.1 0.0 1.5 
 2013 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.4 
China 1995 0.6 5.5 0.0 2.7 
 2013 12.5 32.6 0.0 16.3 
Other BRICS 1995 2.6 6.2 0.0 3.1 
 2013 2.3 9.7 0.0 4.9 
Other Emerging 
G20 
1995 0.0 7.2 3.7 5.4 
 2013 14.6 12.6 4.5 8.5 
 
 
Japan appears as a creditor state in transition. It began the period with a stunning CAS 
score of above 41 percent in 1995. Japan’s subsequent dramatic export collapse (to a CAS of 2.3 
in 2013) likely resulted from the combination of three factors: its intentional currency 
revaluation as a consequence of the 1985 Plaza Accords negotiated with the United States and 
Japan’s other G7 partners, vigorous and state-promoted Chinese and other East Asian 
competition in world markets, and unrelated yet crucial domestic economic stagnation inside 
Japan (Bergsten and Green, eds. 2016; Hart 1992: Mikitani and Mikitani 2014). However, in 
2013 Japan still retained large foreign exchange reserves (FWFX of 10.5) and net foreign 
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financial asset holdings (CWI of 23.1), and an overall Creditor Pillar score of almost 17 percent 
of the global total. Japan’s position also underscores the distinction between a state that 
possesses large financial power capabilities, which Japan does, and a state that chooses to 
exercise those capabilities to exert influence and obtain structural power for itself, which Japan 
in the late 20th and early 21st centuries was either reluctant to do or unsuccessful at (Chey 2009; 
Laurence 2002).   
We also see two rising creditor states. The data on Germany starkly reveal the 
underlying balance of payments contribution to the Eurozone’s contemporary political tensions. 
Following European Monetary Union in 2000, it gradually became apparent that historically 
looser fiscal policies and lower productivity in the so-called European periphery—including 
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland—meant that these countries had entered the Eurozone 
at a level that gave them an effectively overvalued exchange rate, which sparked an initial period 
of overconsumption and flood of imports from countries such as Germany, followed by 
economic stagnation and eventual crises. In contrast to the choices enforced by East Asian and 
Latin American governments, Germans did not employ their ballooning CAS to increase their 
FWFX, which declined throughout the period, and only partially due to the 1999 transfer of some 
official reserves to the European Central Bank. Instead, Germans rapidly expanded their net 
portfolio of foreign financial investments, CWI.  
Meanwhile, beginning in the 1980s, leaders in China took the unprecedented and 
dramatic step of reorienting that country’s huge economy toward export-led growth while 
simultaneously continuing to constrain imports via a combination of inward capital and de facto 
import controls and repressed domestic consumer demand. Despite the second largest external 
surplus (CAS of 12.5 in 2013), which would seem to make a speculative attack on the renminbi 
unlikely, most of this external surplus went into a buildup of highly-liquid currency assets, 
resulting in a FWFX of nearly a third of the global total. China’s increasing capabilities in this 
dimension are the most recent among our set of major states, and China ends the period with a 
Creditor-P score representing about a sixth of the global total. Other emerging economies have 
also thus far tended to prefer highly liquid official reserve assets (FWFX) to the longer-term 
international investments tracked by CWI, although policymakers’ choices may become less risk-
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averse over time. For example, recent Chinese initiatives, including its efforts to found BRICS’ 
financial institutions, the Asian Industrial Investment Bank (AIIB), and its Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), indicate the Xi Jinping government’s plans to deploy China’s financial capital 
more lucratively and strategically in future. 
The creditor state indicators in the GMFPS dataset also may be combined differently. For 
example, the user may identify both major and intermediate powers that the dataset show as 
having outsized capabilities in this arena by identifying states with large Creditor-P/EW or 
Creditor-P/MCI ratios. In 2013, standouts included Singapore, whose creditor status exceeds the 
size of its economy by almost nine times, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, and Norway. In other 
words, these are countries whose profiles in terms of standard hard power capabilities are not 
globally significant, but which punch well above their weight in financial power capabilities. 
4. The Home Financial Market Pillar 
A second significant capability builds on the size and characteristics of a country’s 
domestic financial markets. Deep domestic financial markets, especially efficient public debt 
markets, long have been essential to the rise of enduring and successful modern states, for 
example, by enabling them to raise funds quickly for national defense or foreign conquest (Tilly 
1992; Ferguson 2001; Calomiris and Haber 2014). Moreover, if a government is perceived by the 
markets as a “good” borrower, then it need never repay the principal of the debt, but only the 
interest, as investors will be willing to continue lending indefinitely. If creditors suddenly need to 
access their funds, then they may sell the security in the secondary debt market. A solid and 
trusted home financial market thus contributes directly to a state’s overall power capabilities, 
including its military capability, and enhances its likelihood of remaining autonomous or 
exercising influence abroad. Moreover, most economists accept that financial “depth,” defined as 
a relatively large financial sector as compared to the overall national economy, is a necessary if 
insufficient component of economic growth (Rajan and Zingales 1998; Kalra 2010). However, 
the relationship probably is curvilinear, in that beyond a certain point further increases in the 
financial sector relative to the non-financial economy may be destabilizing (Arcand, Berkes, and 
Panizza 2012; Sahay et al. 2015). Even a home financial market that is not especially transparent, 
  Global Finance Meets Neorealism     19 
 
liquid, or open to global investors can – if it is large and intermediates significant quantities of 
savings – provide an important national power capability in the form of autonomy from the 
volatility and contagion that periodically devastate global financial markets. A large domestic 
financial market, particularly one in which bank credit plays an important role, also enables the 
central government to influence national industrial policy. 
FWD (financial weight, domestic) shows a country’s total national financial assets, 
translated into U.S. dollars at the market exchange rate, as a percentage share of world financial 
assets. Financial assets are here defined to encompass both credit market assets, such as 
commercial bank deposits, and capital markets assets, including company shares and corporate 
and government bonds. MSIF (market share, international finance) measures a second but 
related capability: a country’s importance to global investors as a jurisdiction for trading 
financial assets and purchasing financial services. The export of financial services may develop 
initially to accompany and facilitate trade and/or as a consequence of a country’s international 
creditor status, as in 18th and 19th century Britain. However, a small and open trading state also 
may develop deep and wide domestic financial markets even in the absence of either a large 
economy or a significant external surplus, becoming a financial entrepôt facilitating international 
financial intermediation or offering other financial services, from banking secrecy to money 
laundering. MSIF is calculated as a national financial market’s share of all major cross-border 
financial transactions, or those assets reflecting credits or debits to residents of countries other 
than the national jurisdiction where they are deposited, originated, or traded.5 This indicator thus 
measures a nation’s importance in the global processes of financial intermediation and trading—
which may be large even when a country is not (or no longer is) a net creditor to the world.  
The dataset also includes a summary indicator, the Home Financial Market Pillar 
(Home-P), defined as the mean of FWD and MSIF. We note that Home-P and MSIF (although 
not necessarily FWD) may serve as indicators of a country’s structural power in global financial 
governance, as a state’s domestic financial regulations often shape the behavior of the foreign 
                                                          
5 In calculating FWD and MSIF we rely on data from open sources that is available for most years and most 
countries. Inevitably, therefore, only some financial assets are included, while new, exotic, or sophisticated assets 
tend to be omitted. We surmise that the main effect of including more sophisticated financial products would be 
even greater concentration in this index. 
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actors participating in its domestic markets. Smaller countries may feel compelled to copy the 
financial regulations of dominant economies—even when such regulatory frameworks are not 
ideal for them (Chey 2007, 2014; Drezner 2007; Simmons 2001). A large Home-P share also 
strengthens a country’s ability to influence foreign actors directly, by limiting their access to its 
financial markets. For instance, it is essentially the United States’ still dominant Home-P 
capability that enables the U.S. to impose financial sanctions on countries such as Iran and 
Russia. Figure 3 and Table 3 present the important trends. 
 
 
Figure 3. Home Market Pillar: United States, China, and Aggregates. 
 
We observe these patterns. First, Home Market Capability remains quite concentrated in 
the advanced industrial countries, who accounted for just over half of world shares at the end of 
the research period. The United States remains the dominant country, with a very large home 
market (FWD), the largest share of international intermediation and sales of financial services 
(MSIF), and the greatest overall Home-P capability, assessed at just under a quarter of all such 
capabilities worldwide in 2013. Japan, which in 1995 had an even larger domestic financial 
system, as measured by market exchange rates, than the United States, shrunk substantially over 
the period, but retained the second position in both FWD and overall Home-P capability.  
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Table 3: Home Market Capabilities: Key Countries and Aggregates (% of global totals). 
  FWD* MSIF Home Market 
Capability* 
United States 1995 28.2 18.0 23.1 
 2013 28.8 20.6 24.7 
G6 1995 54.5 42.7 48.6 
 2013 35.5 34.1 35.2 
Japan 1995 31.4 10.6 21.0 
 2013 17.2 4.2 10.8 
Germany  1995 8.2 7.8 8.0 
 2013 4.7  6.8 5.9  
United Kingdom 1995 4.3 12.0 8.1 
 2013 5.0 12.4 9.8 
China 1995 0.9 0.8 0.9 
 2013 9.6 2.5 5.8 
Other BRICS 1995 2.0 1.9 1.7 
 2013 6.6 2.4 4.4 
Other Emerging G20 1995 1.6 2.8 2.0 
 2013 3.5 2.3 2.8 
* Latest data are from 2011. 
 
However, foreign users are not flocking to use Japan’s home financial services, as MSIF was 
only 4.2 percent in 2013. Instead, the second place global destination for international 
intermediation remains the United Kingdom’s City of London, with an MSIF of 12.4 percent—
at least as of 2013, prior to the 2016 “Brexit” vote. Britain demonstrates a clear instance of 
national policymakers acting to maintain and expand an international financial capability, as a 
profit center, certainly, but also for reasons of national power and prestige. The dataset shows 
that Germany, although slightly less relevant than before the advent of the Euro, holds about 6 
percent of this significant international financial capability. Once again, China is the standout 
country in terms of a rapid change in its overall profile, as its Home-P share increased from 1 to 
about 6 percent of the global total, mainly because of growth in domestic finance (like the United 
States and especially Japan including a substantial increase in the public debt), but also due to 
expanded links with global markets. Other large emerging economies also increased their 
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absolute size and relative global weight, although greater exchange rate volatility in many 
emerging markets makes their individual country shares more fluid. 
5. The Currency Pillar 
The third basic international financial capability refers to the influence and structural 
power associated with providing a currency that foreigners wish to use or hold. Currency may be 
a store of value (as when foreign private investors and foreign central banks flock to assets 
denominated in a “hard” currency), unit of account (as when international petroleum prices are 
quoted in U.S. dollars), or useful for transactions purposes (as when the currency of a regional 
trading hub becomes generalized for trade settlement, as increasingly is happening with the 
Chinese renminbi in East Asia) (Cohen 1998, 2015; Eichengreen 2012; Kirshner 2008).  
What sort of international power options might high currency capabilities allow a 
country? The direct economic benefit is that of seigniorage, which refers to the revenue or profit 
to a government from printing currency that the public desires to hold, or more generally to the 
benefit to the national government derived from its ability to expand the nation’s money supply. 
Internationally, seiniorage is generated when foreigners are willing to hold the nation’s currency, 
or government financial assets denominated in it. Foreign holdings of cash and near-cash are 
equivalent to foreigners making an interest-free loan to the issuing country’s government. The 
government and citizens of a country whose currency is widely held abroad also confront lower 
borrowing costs and risks than others whose home currencies suffer from “original sin,” or the 
lack of a long-term loan market in that currency (Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza 2003). 
Benjamin J. Cohen (2012: 16-17) estimates the benefit to the United States from being able to 
borrow abroad in US dollars as amounting to one to three percent of GDP. 
Among the other benefits to a “top currency” state with an attractive reserve currency is 
the ability to run a persistent current account deficit—up to some tipping point, which is by 
definition unknowable in advance—because other states’ central banks and their citizens are 
willing to hold the reserve currency country’s money as a store of value (Cohen 2015: 82-94 and 
passim). The issuing state increases its autonomy, as it can avoid adjusting to external 
imbalances. A strong currency state also has leverage (influence) over foreign governments and 
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citizens who hold its currency, as they acquire an interest in the first country’s prosperity in order 
to protect the value of their assets. There are of course costs, including the likelihood of currency 
overvaluation and reduced exports (“global imbalances”). International demand for a currency 
also enhances the issuing state’s international structural power, by shaping the framework within 
which actors relate to one another (Kirshner 1995; Chey 2012). For example, monetary policy 
decisions in the United States are made with an eye to their domestic macroeconomic effects, yet 
have significant implications (economic externalities) for others. 
CDSRA (currency denomination share in reserves, allocated), considers the shares of 
key currencies in total allocated official reserves held by all national central banks. Central 
banks, of course, are institutions with a fiduciary responsibility to invest conservatively. Central 
bank choices also will be subject to some calculations about what choices will be best for the 
country as a whole, for example, inducing policymakers to shy away from actions that could 
provoke a run on a currency in which the central bank is heavily invested. A second measure, 
CDSD (currency denomination share, debt), records the shares of different major currencies in 
the stock of all outstanding international bonds and other debt securities. When a firm or 
government floats a global bond, it will select the interest rate, time period, and currency of issue 
with an eye to attracting large institutional investors. Market-driven choices on CDSD thus may 
serve as a leading indicator of the direction in which official reserve holdings will move. We 
expect some divergence between our two currency indicators, as CDSD reflects the collective 
choices of individual investors, whose clear incentives, in the case of any fears about the value of 
a given currency, are to exit first. Other good indicators for assessing currency capabilities would 
measure the annual shares of total trade settlements or foreign exchange turnover denominated in 
various currencies. Unfortunately, we were unable to locate publicly-available time series data 
covering multiple countries in these categories. 
The composite indicator for this dimension, the dataset’s Currency Pillar (Currency-P), 
has a 60 percent weighting for CDSRA and a 40 percent weighting for CDSD, reflecting our 
judgment that observation that central bank choices may be intrinsically more politically 
significant than short term market choices. However, the size of global corporate debt markets 
($18 trillion in 2015:Q4) is close to twice the size of official foreign exchange reserves ($11 
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trillion), and many other private financial assets not easily-tracked by currencies of issue, 
including corporate shares and financial derivatives, remain outside the dataset. If a researcher 
wished to weight the included components, CDSRA and CDSD differently, the GMFPS dataset 
makes this easy. 
 
Figure 4: Currency Pillar: United States, China, and Aggregates. 
 
Table 4: Currency Capabilities: Key Countries and Aggregates (% of global totals). 
  CDSRA CDSD* Currency Capability* 
United States 1995 68.1 48.9 62.9 
 2013 62.8 54.9 59.7 
G6 1995 31.2 36.6 31.2 
 2013 35.0 28.8 32.5 
Japan  1995 7.8 16.0 10.3 
 2013 3.9 3.5 3.8 
Germany 1995 18.2 18.3 17.0 
 2013 22.3 22.5 22.4 
United Kingdom 1995 2.4 0.0 1.8 
 2013 4.1 0.0 2.5 
Non-G20: Switz. 1995 0.4 0.0 0.1 
 2013 0.3 0.0 0.2 
G7 1995 99.3 85.5 94.1 
 2013 97.9 83.7 92.2 
* Series begins 1999. 
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Figure 4 and Table 4 show that the G7 countries continue to account for massively 
dominant shares of international currency capability in each of these categories, with almost 99 
percent of global reserves (CDSRA) and 85 percent of international debt issues (CDSD). Over the 
study period, the United States dollar has a slightly decreased share in CDSRA, but increased its 
dominance in global corporate debt issues (CDSD), notwithstanding the fact that the 2007-09 
global financial crisis began in the United States. Although the yen remains important, but its 
relative share, in common with most of the other indicators of Japan’s national financial 
capabilities, has collapsed. We assess Germany’s currency clout initially with shares for the 
German mark, and subsequently with shares for the Euro divided between Germany and France 
in the ratio of their respective shares of global CDSRA holdings in 2000, when the Euro first was 
implemented. Through 2013, global preferences for Euro-denominated sovereign and corporate 
debt increased, and Germany’s Currency-P share represented about 22 percent of the notional 
global total. This said, the rise of the populist and nationalist right in key European countries 
threatens both the single currency and common market (Germain and Schwartz 2014). The 
United Kingdom’s currency is intriguing and somewhat contradictory. Sterling continues to be 
held as an official reserve asset, approximately mirroring Britain’s estimated overall share in 
global material power capabilities. Nonetheless, the global share of sterling-denominated 
business borrowing (CDSD) is negligible, and the Brexit will likely decrease the pound’s global 
role. Through 2013, none of the emerging market currencies had made a dent in world currency 
demand.  
The elephant in the room in any discussion of international currency capabilities is of 
course the future of China’s currency. Much has been written on the renminbi’s likely expansion 
in future (Chey 2012; Helleiner and Kirshner 2014; McNally and Gruen 2017; Rabinovitch 
2016; Subramanian 2011; World Bank 2011:125-159). In a move with great symbolic 
significance although smaller immediate practical consequences, the IMF announced in late 2015 
that, beginning in October 2016, it would collect data on RMB holdings in order to include it in 
the currency basket of the IMF’s own quasi-currency, the Special Drawing Right (SDR), initially 
allocating it a weight of 10.9  percent (IMF 2016). Nonetheless, through 2013, neither China nor 
any other member of the BRICS or emerging G20 appeared in the official statistics on currency 
shares in official reserves or international bond holdings except in the category of “other.” 
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6. The Debtor Pillar 
The fourth concept we propose for conceptualizing the global financial resources 
potentially available to incumbent governments of sovereign states, hoping to pursue their larger 
foreign policy aims, is that of a Debtor Pillar (Debtor-P), aggregating the somewhat counter-
intuitive power capabilities that nonetheless may be exercised by sovereign debtors. One 
normally thinks of creditors and investors possessing greater power capabilities than debtors, 
although this is always more true before a loan has been made than after. Once the transaction is 
made, however, the creditor has a strong interest in the borrower’s behavior, as otherwise the 
loan funds disappear. Cross-border contract enforcement is always difficult and debtors, 
especially sovereign debtors, have many instruments, including even certain international norms, 
with which to exert pressure on creditors.  
Clearly, being an international debtor country is not exactly a power capability in the 
same sense as having a strong economy, large population, many naval warships, or a huge 
foreign exchange reserve. Why include it in the dataset? One reason has been mentioned: large 
debtors acquire power over their creditors, as it is not in the latter’s interest to have the former 
default. Moreover, a large international debt, arguably perversely, serves as a reputational 
indicator: countries able to borrow significant sums, particularly in global private markets, have 
convinced investors of their credibility. As noted in the earlier discussion of the Home Financial 
Market Pillar, states whose governments are able to borrow posssess an enormous advantage in 
times of war or other emergency. A third reason to consider a large debtor state as potentially 
powerful is that countries with liberal, open capital markets may find themselves inadvertently 
“borrowing” internationally, as global investors react to volatility abroad by fleeing to the “safe 
haven” that their national markets appear to offer. International safe haven status is of course 
also linked to currency capability, as unsettled or uneasy investors flee tumultuous shores and 
currencies in favor of “hard currency” countries. A safe haven country is central to the 
functioning of the entire international financial system, and a dominant safe haven country 
possesses enormous potential structural power to set and interpret the rules for both overt 
(formal) and implicit (less obviously institutionalized) global financial governance. Moreover, a 
  Global Finance Meets Neorealism     27 
 
country able to borrow increases its potential autonomy, as it can delay adjusting to external 
imbalances, just as it can by holding substantial shares in the Currency-P.  
GDWI (gross debtor weight, international) represents the sum of a country’s financial 
liabilities to foreigners, as a share of the total international financial liabilities of all countries, in 
a given year. Such liabilities include foreign bank deposits within a country, foreign holdings of 
the corporate and sovereign loans and bond debt of the country’s government and citizens, and 
foreigners’ ownership of corporate equity (shares and foreign direct investment), but exclude 
foreign holdings of the country’s currency. GDWI thus assesses the relative size of a country’s 
actual foreign borrowings, irrespective of the country’s net external balance. NDWI (net debtor 
weight, international), however, applies only to countries whose overall holdings of international 
financial assets reveal a deficit. NDWI, constructed similarly to the CWI indicator described 
earlier, shows the share of a debtor country’s debt in the total international financial debt of all 
debtor countries. We define a country’s score on the Debtor Pillar as the mean of GDWI and 
NDWI. 
 
Figure 5: Debtor Pillar: United States, China, and Aggregates 
 
Notwithstanding our long socialization to conceptualize poor and developing countries as 
the world’s champion debtors, it is advanced countries that oligopolize world debt markets. 
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Table 5: Debtor Presence: Key Countries and Aggregates (% of global totals). 
 
  GDWI NDWI Debtor Presence 
United States 1995 17.8 16.1 17.0 
 2013 20.9 33.4 27.2 
G6 1995 38.7 13.4 26.0 
 2013 30.6 8.0 19.3 
Japan 1995 8.3 0.0 4.1 
 2013 3.2 0.0 1.6 
Germany  1995 7.0 0.0 3.5 
 2013 5.7 0.0 2.8 
United Kingdom 1995 11.0* 0.8* 5.9 
 2013 11.4* 0.5* 5.9 
China 1995 1.2 2.9 2.0 
 2013 3.0 0.0 1.5 
Other BRICS 1995 2.5 7.5 5.0 
 2013 3.0 7.3 5.2 
Other Emerging G20 1995 3.4 12.9 8.3 
 2013 2.7 7.6 5.1 
 
The G7 went from a 43 to a 46 percent share of total global Debtor-P capabilities during the 
eighteen years tracked by the GMFPS dataset. The government and private firms and individuals 
in the contemporary but declining international financial hegemon, the United States, account 
for just over a fifth of all international borrowing (GDWI) and a full third of the world total of 
the borrowing of all net debtor countries (NDWI). The former financial hegemon, the United 
Kingdom, has an enormous gross debt but only a relatively modest net debt. Japan and 
Germany have gross debts but are not net debtors. However, the remaining G7 countries – Italy, 
France, and Canada – have NDWI scores of 4.3, 3.2, and 1.8 of global totals, respectively. 
Although China began the study period with a significant NDWI of almost 3 percent, by 2013 it 
had nearly tripled GDWI, but had no net borrowing. Figure 4 and Table 4 suggest that the large 
emerging economies as a group had several large debtors, and the GMFPS dataset provides easy 
access to information on specific countries.  
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7. Global Financial Governance Pillar 
A final and important conceptual category for a state’s international financial power 
capability is its de facto and de jure influence and representation in global monetary and 
financial governance institutions. International voice in global governance may be exercised 
overtly and directly, as via executive leadership or voting shares in formal international 
organizations. Arguably the informal agenda-setting and decision-making that occurs informally 
in loosely organized “clubs” of dominant actors in international regimes is even more important. 
Here sovereign states and their representatives, as well as a variety of capable non-state and sub-
state actors (including firms, NGOs, national ministries, and subnational government 
representatives) constitute, implement, and arbitrate international rules, laws, procedures, and 
norms (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010; Keohane and Nye 2001; Krasner, ed. 1983). In fact, 
some non-state financial actors, including large transnational banks and institutional investors, 
are so capable—for example, as creditors, oligopoly market-makers, investors, and within 
transnational financial regulatory or advocacy bodies—that one legitimately may wonder 
whether they represent states in the international sphere, or the reverse (as neo-Marxist analysts 
would have it). This project assumes that sovereign states, however their preferences come to be 
constituted, ultimately matter most in international relations.  
At a later date we hope to add an indicator or several reflecting the capabilities of 
different states, and their citizens, in global financial and monetary governance. The dataset 
ideally will have measures reflecting the relative “voice” of different countries within 
multilateral institutions (whose only members are sovereign governments) and transnational 
organizations (whose members, in addition to sovereign states, may include subnational levels of 
government, functional units of the national government, and/or private actors, ranging from 
advocacy organizations to sectoral trade associations). Thus, in the international financial and 
monetary sphere global governance is provided by, inter alia, the G20 (a multilateral club with 
closed and exclusive membership yet no formal organization or bylaws), the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank (multilateral organizations with elaborate rules, open to all 
sovereign governments), the Bank for International Settlements (whose members are mostly 
national central banks, some public and some privately-owned), the Asian Development Bank (a 
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multilateral bank with mostly regional membership), the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (whose members are securities regulators, some reporting to the finance ministry 
but others only to their private sector members), and the Institute for International Finance (a 
transnational business association of the world’s largest banks and institutional investors). Data 
on the nationality of senior technocrats in these and similar institutions, as well as the 
distribution of formal votes among countries or their citizens, would be one place to begin. One 
challenge is that of weighting the relative importance of different organizations, or of members 
and officers in a given body. In any case, it would be desirable to be able to compute a composite 
Governance Pillar (Governance-P), calculated to reflect a country’s voice in global financial 
and monetary governance. This would be an important measure of structural power, defined as 
the ability to set agendas, determine standard operating procedures, and shape global regulatory 
and development norms.   
8. Conclusions: comparisons and extending the argument 
The preceding sections have explained multiple indicators, including five composites, 
touching on five of the six categories the authors judge essential to assess countries’ relative 
power capabilities, overall, and in the sphere of global finance and money. We began with a 
traditional state power index. The Material Capabilities Index serves as a reality check and 
baseline against which to assess the somewhat different movement described in our other four 
realized indices. The remaining four composites – Creditor Pillar, Home Financial Market 
Pillar, Currency Pillar, and Debtor Pillar – each capture a distinct aspect of the types of 
international financial resources that incumbent national leaders sometimes attempt to employ in 
the service of their countries’ larger foreign policy aims. There are of course many other ways in 
which both policymakers, global investors, journalists, and academic researchers assess the 
relative strengths of national financial institutions and markets, from credit ratings, to size and 
performance rankings of global banks and securities markets, to comparative quality 
assessments, usually based on surveys of global investors, of a country’s business environment 
and rule of law.6 In the main, these measures do not lend themselves to the type of analysis 
                                                          
6 For example, the World Bank’s annual Doing Business reports, at www.doingbusiness.org 
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facilitated by the GMFPS dataset, which calculates countries’ relative shares as percentages of 
annual global totals. The GMFPS dataset is intended for explicitly political rather than economic 
research, and as such may supplement, not replace, the wealth of comparative ranking and rating 
data available on national financial and monetary capabilities. 
Table 6: Five Relative Power Capabilities Compared: Key States and Aggregates (% of global 
totals). 
 
 
 
 
 
Political & 
Economic 
Capabilities 
(MCI) 
Global Monetary & Financial Capabilities 
Creditor 
Pillar 
Home 
Market 
Pillar* 
Currency 
Pillar** 
Debtor 
Pillar 
United States 
1995 20.8 2.7 23.1 62.9 17.0 
2013 18.4 0.6 24.7 59.7 27.2 
G6 
1995 31.8 39.4 48.6 31.2 26.0 
2013 17.9 27.5 35.2 32.5 19.3 
Japan 
1995 12.7 30.3 21.0 10.3 4.1 
2013 6.7 16.8 10.8 3.8 1.6 
Germany 
1995 6.4 4.8 8.0 17.0 3.5  
2013 3.8 9.6 5.9 22.4 2.8  
United 
Kingdom 
1995 3.5 1.5 8.1 1.8 5.9 
2013 2.6 0.4 9.8 2.5 5.9 
China 
1995 6.0 2.7 0.9 0.0 2.0 
2013 14.4 16.3 5.8 0.0 1.5 
Other BRICS 
1995 9.2 3.1 1.7  0.0 5.0 
2013 10.9 4.9 4.4 0.0 5.2 
Emerging 
G20 (no 
BRICS) 
1995 6.1 5.4 2.0 0.0 8.3 
2013 8.8 8.5 2.8 0.0 5.1 
Full G20 
1995 74.8 53.8 77.4 94.0 62.2 
2013 71.7 58.0 74.8 93.3 64.5 
 
* Latest data are from 2011 
** Earliest data are from 1999 
 
 
What is the value-added by this project and dataset? Tables 6 and 7 together summarize 
and modestly extend our main empirical findings and analytical claims. Table 6, which reviews 
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the scores of major countries and aggregates on all five indices, confirms that most of the action 
in both overall power and financial or monetary power capabilities lies with the set of G20 
countries. Financial and overall power capabilities are being redistributed within this group. The 
United States’ role as a global creditor, already small, has now shrunk to virtual insignificance. 
However, the United States’ home financial market accounts for about a quarter of global 
capabilities throughout the period, its currency remains crushingly dominant, and its weight as an 
international debtor represents over a quarter of the global total. The remaining large advanced 
industrial countries in the G6 are still important creditors, yet this is entirely due to Japan and 
Germany, and Japan’s relative importance as a global creditor shrunk by half in this short 
period. As a group, the G6 hold large but falling home market capabilities, again mainly due to a 
collapse in Japan’s relative share. Nonetheless, almost all of the currency power not wielded by 
the United States lies with the G6, but mainly Germany, the dominant country in the Eurozone. 
G6 members also account for about a fifth of our international debt composite: all of the group 
have significant gross foreign borrowing (GDWI), and four are net debtors (non-zero scores on 
NDWI). China, meanwhile, notably increased its scores on the dataset’s overall (MCI), creditor, 
and home market dimensions, yet as of 2013 lacked currency power, despite the buzz around 
renminbi internationalization. Finally, and as a group, the other emerging powers in the G20 
increased their creditor status modestly, and the non-China BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
South Africa) more than doubled their home financial market resources, although from a low 
base. Given the fact that emerging economies are poorer in terms of income/capita, and have 
relatively labor-abundant and/or natural resource-abundant economies, neoclassical economics 
assumptions about global markets would imply that emerging economies should be debtors, not 
creditors – yet this seems not to be the case for many of the flagship emerging powers that are 
members of the G20. 
Table 7, very tentatively and provisionally, extends the argument in a different direction. 
It combines broad themes of international monetary history, shown in four historical periods 
(19th century to the First World War, interwar period, the postwar Bretton Woods era, and the 
Bretton Woods era aftermath to the end of the Cold War), followed by post-1995 trends mapped  
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Table 7: The Financial Life Cycles of Major States: A Provisional Sketch. 
 Creditor 
Pillar 
Home 
Market 
Pillar 
Currency 
Pillar 
Debtor 
Pillar 
Governance 
Pillar 
[no index yet] 
19th C. to 
WWI 
Britain/UK 
hegemonic? 
Britain/UK 
dominant 
Britain/UK 
hegemonic 
Many countries Britain/UK 
dominant  
Interwar 
period 
UK ()? 
US ()  
UK dominant, 
but () 
UK () 
US ()  
  
Bretton 
Woods era 
(1945 - 1971) 
UK () 
US hegemonic 
or dominant 
US dominant 
UK significant 
US hegemonic 
UK relevant 
UK & W. 
Europe 
significant  
US hegemonic? 
UK significant 
(but slow ) 
Bretton 
Woods 
aftermath 
(~1973 to 
~1990) 
US rapid () to 
gone 
UK still () 
Japan () to 
dominant 
US dominant 
UK () 
Japan () to 
significant 
US hegemonic 
Japan & 
Germany 
slowly () 
UK () to gone 
US rapid () US dominant  
G6 jointly 
significant 
 
 
Post-Cold 
War era 
(GMFPS 
dataset 
coverage) 
[UK, US gone] 
Japan rapid () 
to only 
significant 
Germany & 
China (each 
 to 
significance) 
 
 
US dominant & 
stable 
Japan rapid () 
to barely 
significant 
Relevant: UK, 
Germany, 
France, China 
(rapid ) 
US hegemonic & 
stable 
Japan rapid () 
to gone 
Germany/Euro 
significant (& 
still ) 
 
US rapid () to 
dominant 
UK, France, 
Italy jointly 
significant 
 
US dominant 
G6 jointly 
significant (but 
slow ) 
China () 
Other emerging 
(e.g. BRICS) 
() 
 
Note: Hegemonic (x ≥50%) > Dominant (50% > x ≥ 25%) > Significant (25% > x ≥ 10%) > Relevant (10% > x ≥ 
5%) > Gone (x > 5%) 
 
through the GFMCS dataset. While we have plausibly identified levels and trends for major 
states throughout the table, the outcome cells characterizing relative state capabilities prior to the 
mid-1990s are guesstimates. Only the four initial cells of the bottom row are backed by the 
detailed calculations of our dataset. For the sake of a quick summary, the table identifies a 
country as “hegemonic” when it holds half or more of the total capabilities in a given financial 
pillar, as “dominant” if its share is between half and a quarter, as “significant” with a 10 to 25 
percent share, and as “relevant” with a share between 5 and 10 percent. These cutoff levels are 
not determined by the distribution of the data, but instead reflect the authors’ conception of what 
share of total resources a single state would need to control in order to behave as a “hegemon,” 
for example.   
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In the late 18th and especially the 19th centuries, Britain displaced the Netherlands as the 
primary international trader, imperialist, and creditor, site of the most important financial market, 
and issuer of the major world currency (Eichengreen 1996; Ferguson 2001; Schwartz 2010). By 
the late 19th century countries throughout Europe and the Americas were aspiring to emulate 
Britain’s success by implementing the Gold Standard. Britain was hegemonic in its currency 
capability and perhaps in its creditor power, and at least dominant in its home financial market 
share in the world, mainly through its colonial empire. The interwar years saw Britain’s relative 
decline on all of these dimensions, and the rise of a former emerging economy and debtor 
country: the United States, which increased its overall and financial/monetary power to become 
the hegemonic capitalist state from the mid-20th century to the present.  
Britain in the 19th century and the United States in the mid-20th century each followed a 
similar pattern of running current account surpluses (CAS), then accumulating net stocks of 
foreign financial assets (CWI), while the international use of their home currency also expanded. 
In these historical cases, export capabilities supported the subsequent and overlapping yet 
roughly sequential development by the economically and militarily dominant country of creditor, 
home market, and currency power (Subramanian 2011). As current deficits appeared, creditor 
power gradually declined, and both the former financial hegemon and the current one became 
weighty global debtors, while retaining substantial (in the UK) and dominant (in the US) home 
market capabilities. However, by about a decade after the end of the postwar Bretton Woods 
international monetary regime (roughly the mid-1980s, in the penultimate period tracked by 
Table 7), the accumulated net foreign asset holdings of both the US and UK had melted away. 
The UK has retained its still impressive home financial market presence by a conscious public 
policy focus on maintaining a strong international role: that is, its MSIF remains high, although 
its FWD continues to shrink.  
By the 1980s, Japan developed a large and persistent current account surplus and 
become an enormous net creditor to the world. However, the implied financial life-cycle of 
major powers did not play out, suggesting that a dominant position in on the Creditor Pillar may, 
but does not necessarily, act as the precursor to significant shares in the Home Financial Market 
Pillar or Currency Pillar. Instead, Japan’s home market capability remained strongly weighted 
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toward domestic participants (FWD), and never attracted significant international business 
(MSIF), even from its geographic region. Over the almost two decades covered by the GMFPS 
dataset (1995-2013), Japan’s relative power capabilities declined in each of our indices. Over the 
same period Germany rose as the predominant regional financial and currency power in 
Europe—as well as a major power internationally—yet its future in a united Eurozone remains 
uncertain. 
The period covered by the GMFPS dataset also provides insight into China’s rise. 
China’s increase as an international creditor is dramatic. Moreover, its shifting national financial 
profile results at least partly from conscious choices pursued by national leaders. Through the 
period covered by the dataset, the majority of China’s foreign assets remained in low-yielding 
and liquid official reserves (FWFX), although since 2014 Chinese policymakers have announced, 
and begin to implement, a strategy of spending on building infrastructure and acquiring access to 
agricultural and natural resources abroad, in ways reminiscent of earlier imperial projects, which 
eventually will be reflected in an increase in CWI. China’s leaders remain ambivalent about both 
domestic financial deregulation and capital account liberalization. Their larger home market 
capability rests uneasily on expanded domestic credit and capital markets (FWD), while links to 
global markets (MSIF) grow more slowly, as ruling elites fear external financial liberalization 
will bring loss of domestic political control (Vermeiren 2013; Volz 2014).  
What might the future hold? The global debtor presence of the United States, which we 
have conceptualized, schizophrenically, as both a power resource and a clear marker of a 
declining hegemon, has exploded, and yet as noted, the United States’ currency hegemony is as 
yet barely diminished. However, at some level of indebtedness (unknowable in advance), other 
dimensions of international financial and monetary capabilities will begin to decline, possibly 
gradually (as with the United Kingdom), but also possibly via an enormous global crisis. 
Arguably the inability (although not the unwillingness) of Britain to provide international 
monetary and financial leadership in the 1920s and 1930s, coupled with the unwillingness 
(although perhaps not the inability) of the United States to assume such leadership, played 
important roles in spreading and deepening the Great Depression (Frieden 2006; Kindleberger 
1973; Eichengreen 1996). Since Donald Trump took office in January 2017, the United States 
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has demonstrated a markedly adversarial view of global governance institutions and 
achievements, seemingly unaware of both the benefits they have provided to the hegemon and 
their fragility. For the moment, nonetheless, the United States, along with its major allies in the 
G6, exercise dominant and jointly significant shares, respectively, in the Global Financial 
Governance Pillar, although the Chinese, sometimes assisted by other emerging powers such as 
the other BRICS, are quite eager to expand their influence and structural power (Roberts, 
Armijo, and Katada forthcoming 2017; Helleiner and Kirshner 2014; Stone 2011; Wade 2013). 
These findings remain preliminary, and the composition of the GMFPS dataset itself is 
open to reform or expansion in additional directions. The main innovation introduced by the 
GMFPS dataset is that it is explicitly relational and systemic: through mapping relative global 
shares of various national credit, investment, currency, and borrowing capabilities it can help 
trace the fortunes of countries with respect to one another. For example, it sets into stark relief 
the comparative recent financial capabilities trajectories of major powers including the United 
States, Britain, Germany, Japan, and China. Full access to the dataset will be available to the 
research community by mid-2017, and the authors look forward to making useful modifications 
in it in accordance with suggestions from our colleagues.  
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